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DOUGLAS M. BRANSON*
Thomas Berger, a noted Canadian barrister, received a commis-
sion from the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, an organization of ab-
original peoples in Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and elsewhere, to
conduct an extensive study of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act ("ANCSA").' To fund the study Berger raised money from an
impressive array of sources. 2 He then spent three years conducting
hearings in the villages of Alaska. He took testimony from "more
than 1,450 witnesses."' 3 The result is a book, Village Journey: The
Report of the Alaska Native Review Commission ("Village Journey"),
that recounts Native testimony and prescribes a solution for the
problems of ANCSA.
At first blush, Berger's descriptions of the hearings and Native
way of life produce a volume both lyrical and empirical-a rare and
readable combination. Indeed, on one level Village Journey may rep-
resent a comprehensive statement of the predominant Native senti-
ment. The book, however, has numerous shortcomings.
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1. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629(a) (1986). For a relatively comprehensive description
of ANCSA, see Branson, Square Pegs in Round Holes: Alaska Native Claims Settle-
ment Corporations Under Corporate Law, 8 UCLA-ALASKA L. REv. 103, 106-12
(1979).
2. See T. BERGER, VILLAGE JOURNEY: THE REPORT OF THE ALASKA NATIVE
REvIEw COMMISSION ix-x (1985). Sources of funding included the National Endow-
ment for the Humanities, the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, among others.
3. Id. at 7.
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As an attempted comprehensive analysis of ANCSA, Berger's
work fails. Village Journey is advocacy scholarship-advocacy mas-
querading as scholarship. Berger's study is completely outcome ori-
ented and devoid of any balance. Berger adopts a revisionist
approach4 and concludes that Congress forced the billion dollar and
forty-four million acre settlement upon unwilling or duped Natives
who lacked capable leadership. 5 In reaching his conclusions, Berger
completely ignores corporation law, economic analysis, and other po-
tentially conflicting points of view. Even the selection of testimony
leaves the reader incredulous. Only one Alaska Native whose testi-
mony Berger excerpts found a favorable thing to say about ANCSA
and the Native corporations. 6
Alaskans should be concerned about books such as Village Jour-
ney. Berger's type of partial Native rights advocacy may be defining
the framework that will determine what happens to ANCSA in the
watershed year of 1991. The solutions chosen to remedy the perceived
problems of ANCSA may affect Alaska at least as much as did the
original 1971 settlement.
Berger, along with many Native leaders, justifiably asserts that
problems exist with ANCSA. One notable problem, due in part to
forces beyond Native control, is that most of the regional and village
corporations that acted as receptacles for the settlement proceeds of
4. A revisionist historian is often contrasted to an orthodox historian, although
the contrast is not meaningful to some:
In the sense that the revisionist reverses an existing interpretation of an
event in history the label is correct but of little value [because] every genera-
tion of historians tends to give new interpretations to the past. To the Amer-
ican diplomatic historian, however, "revisionist" is the label given to a
number of men who, after one or both world wars, took upon themselves the
task of persuading the American people to change their view of the origins of
those wars and of the reasons for American intervention in them.
W. COHEN, THE AMERICAN REvISIONISTS: THE LESSONS OF INTERVENTION IN
WORLD WAR I at vii (1967). Revisionism has since spread to reinterpretation of the
cold war, American foreign policy in general, and American economic history. See,
e.g., J. KOLKO & C. KOLKO, THE LIMITS OF POWER: THE WORLD AND UNITED
STATES FOREIGN POLICY, 1945-54 (1972); G. KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVA-
TISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY 1900-16 (1963); W. AP-
PLEMAN WILLIAMS, OPEN DOOR POLICY AND THE COLD WAR (1971). Revisionists'
pronounced tendency is to level criticism at existing or prevalant American interpreta-
tions of past events, institutions, and processes, often from a leftist perspective.
5. See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
6. See T. BERGER, supra note 2, at 27 ("We [Natives] have become a fairly sig-
nificant political force and ... we own a bank, we do several things not even dreamt of
ten to fifteen years [ago]. We're also finding out that you can be a Native banker and a
Native lawyer and a Native teacher."); cf Polan, Eskimo Leaders Push to Instill Tra-
ditions as a Deadline Looms, Wall St. J., June 26, 1985, at 1, col. 1 (conflicting views of
ANCSA among Natives and Native leaders).
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Native land claims have been unsuccessful.7 When Alaska Natives be-
come free to alienate their shares in 1991, the title to subsistence lands
held by these corporations will be vulnerable to creditors' claims,
taxes, and corporate takeover.
To deal with these problems, Alaskans with divergent points of
view together must develop an analytical framework within which to
formulate solutions that accommodate competing interests and correct
those defects in the ANCSA scheme that jeopardize Natives' birth-
rights. Village Journey fails to set forth such a constructive frame-
work. Instead, Berger's one-sided approach results in an ill-conceived
and unbalanced recommendation. He prescribes that before 1991
Alaska Natives receive all that the Natives and Indian affairs special-
ists claim is justly deserved.
In some detail Berger's proposals for ANCSA and for 1991 are:
1. All lands held by ANCSA corporations should be transferred to
specially created tribal governments. Such a transfer would put the
land beyond creditors' and tax collectors' claims.8
2. Natives should enjoy exclusive hunting and fishing rights on the
forty-four million acres of ANCSA lands, as well as exclusive jurisdic-
tion over such hunting and fishing.9 The State of Alaska should be
prohibited from telling "them when, what, and how much they can
harvest."10
3. ANCSA's transfer of eleven percent of Alaska's lands to Native
corporations provides Natives with "inadequate" hunting and fishing
rights.11 Berger suggests that "Native people must have guaranteed
access to their other fishing, hunting, trapping, and gathering areas on
state and federal lands."'12 These "other" lands constitute most of the
remaining eighty-eight to eighty-nine percent of Alaska. In addition,
7. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ANCSA 1985 STUDY at V-35 to V-
105 (Draft June 29, 1984) (summary financial data for the 13 regional corporations).
8. T. BERGER, supra note 2, at 158-59.
9. Id. at 163.
10. Id. at 162.
11. Id.
12. Id. Berger holds up Indian fishing rights in the State of Washington as a
prototype for his Alaska vision. In Washington v. Washington State Commercial Pas-
senger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979), the Supreme Court upheld a lower
court treaty interpretation that gave Indians the right to one-half of the harvestable
catch within treaty waters and jurisdiction over their members' fishing. According to
Berger, "[t]he affirmation of these treaty rights has revitalized the Native economies
and societies in western Washington." T. BERGER, supra note 2, at 163.
Any revitalization in Washington, however, has occurred at tremendous cost.
See, e.g., Parker, A Decade Later, Boldt Decision is Still Snarled in Controversy, Seattle
Times, Feb. 8, 1984, at 1, cols. 1-4; Douglas, The Boldt Revolt, The Seattle Weekly,
Nov. 3, 1976, at 9. Hatred, armed range wars between non-Indians and Indians, back-
lash and resentment, and untold economic losses for non-Indian fishermen forced
from their chosen vocations has been the result of the interpretation. See, e.g., Parker,
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Berger proposes that Native authorities share jurisdiction to police
hunting and fishing on those lands.1 3
4. Congress should appropriate additional sums of money as further
"compensation" to Natives. 14 Dissipation of resources from litigation
over terms of the Act, high inflation in ANCSA's early years, and
delay in conveying lands to the corporations are factors that mandate
such compensation. 15
5. The Native regional corporations should continue to exist, 16 but
with several important changes. First, the regional corporations
should convey title to subsurface estates, which they hold as to all
forty-four million acres, to newly created tribal governments.1 7 Sec-
ond, as to the approximately sixteen million acres held in fee simple,
regional corporations should consider transferring these lands to the
tribal governments as well, "to ensure unified village control of the
greatest possible acreage." 8 Alternatively, the regional corporations
might retain title but grant "subsistence easements" in the land to the
tribal governments. 19 Any new owner of those lands would be re-
quired to honor the easements and would be precluded from develop-
ing any other resources that the land contains.20
supra; Douglas, supra. For Berger to hold up the Washington experience as a "nota-
ble example," see T. BERGER, supra note 2, at 163, has to be the product of unfamili-
arity with the negative consequences in Washington flowing from the Washington
fishing rights decisions.
13. T. BERGER, supra note 2, at 162-63.
14. See id. at 166.
15. Id.
16. ANCSA provided for 12 regional corporations dividing the entire state. A
13th regional corporation also came into existence to receive settlement proceeds for
Natives not residing in any of the 12 geographically defined regions. ANCSA also
provided for a second layer of smaller corporations. The Act named 205 possible
village corporations and provided for formation of others. See, e.g., Branson, supra
note 1, at 106-08. The relationships, including revenue sharing, between the two sets
of corporations are complex and thus beyond the scope of this essay. For a descrip-
tion of those relationships, see id. at 108-14; see also Price, Region-Village Relations
Under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 5 UCLA-ALASKA L. REv. 58 (1975);
Price, Region- Village Relations Under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act-Part
II, 5 UCLA-ALASKA L. REV. 237 (1976).
17. T. BERGER, supra note 2, at 169.
18. Id. Why such a conveyance for little or no consideration would not amount
to corporate waste Berger fails to reveal. Corporate waste has been defined as a
"[t]ransaction ... that no person of ordinary sound business judgment would say that
the consideration received by the corporation was a fair exchange for what was given
by the corporation." AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOV-
ERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 1.30 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984);
accord Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 224 (Del. 1979); Schreiber v. Bryan, 447
A.2d 17, 26 (Del. Ch. 1982).
19. T. BERGER, supra note 2, at 170.
20. No rational purchaser would then ever purchase the regional corporation
lands.
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Finally, Congress should pass laws abrogating the Native share-
holder appraisal remedies provided by Alaska state corporate law
when there is a sale of all or substantially all of a corporation's as-
sets.2 ' Such a remedy entitles a dissenting shareholder to seek ap-
praisal for shares in the state courts in lieu of acquiescing in the sale of
corporate assets.22
6. Most village corporations should dissolve. 23 If village corpora-
tions are engaged in profit-making endeavors that depend upon the
retention of land, they should be permitted to lease the transferred
lands from the tribal governments. 24 Regarding the rights of third
parties when village corporations dissolve, Berger states that "[tihird
parties with bona fide claims against village corporations must be pro-
tected. It may be that Congress should appropriate funds to pay off
these debts, of which no one knows the full extent. '25
In Berger's view, the Alaska Natives desire and deserve life in a
modem world with all of the benefits and none of the burdens. He
writes: "The Native peoples of Alaska want their own lands and their
own forms of government, and they also want access to the social,
economic, and political institutions of the dominant society." 26
Because of his unbalanced approach, Berger's proposals and their
underlying justifications are inappropriate, naive, and at times alienat-
ing. At one point Berger holds up the Treaty of New York27 as a
model for Alaska because it provided that "any citizen of the United
States [who] settled on Creek land without Creek permission... for-
feited the protection of the United States."' 28 Berger further notes ap-
provingly that "[e]ntry into Creek territory could be made only with
the display of a valid passport. '29
Berger prefers tribal to municipal governments so that white
community members can be excluded from all voice in local affairs.30
"[The Natives] want Native political institutions. They are talking
21. T. BERGER, supra note 2, at 158-59, 197.
22. The relevant sections of the Alaska Business Corporation Act are ALASKA
STAT. §§ 10.05.435-.447 (1985) (shareholder vote and dissenters' rights upon "sale or
exchange of all, or substantially all, the property and assets" of the corporation
outside the normal course of business).
23. See T. BERGER, supra note 2, at 168.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 196.
26. Id. at 177.
27. Treaty of New York, arts. 6 & 7, Aug. 7, 1790, in TREATIES BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE INDIANS 1778-1831, at 29, 31 (new ed. 1975).
28. T. BERGER, supra note 2, at 120.
29. Id.
30. Berger states: "The fact is, state-chartered local government gives non-Na-
tives access to power." Id. at 145.
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about sovereignty. ' 31 Berger finds this acceptable because "[i]t is un-
reasonable . .. to assume that tribal government will discriminate
against non-members .... "32 Such a view is contrary to human
nature.
Berger advances lofty justifications for his one-sided rewriting of
ANCSA and remapping of Alaska. "Arguments for the rule of law in
international relations," opines Berger, "can never be soundly based
until the nations that have dispossessed and displaced indigenous peo-
ples accept the precepts of international law that now require a fair
accommodation of indigenous peoples in their own nations. ' 33 These
arguments are misplaced. Alaska Natives have not been "dispossessed
and displaced," at least not in any radical sense. Many Natives con-
tinue to reside in the same area as did their forbearers. 34 True, by
receiving outright title to millions of acres they gave up access to other
lands. For the surrender of claims to those lands, which had been
thought to impede progress, Native Alaskans received a settlement
generous by most objective measures, albeit ill-conceived in execution.
Another view Berger repeatedly advances is that Congress thrust
or "imposed" the ANCSA scheme upon the Natives. 35 This rationale
for the proposals outlined by the author is simply naive. Congress
never acts, but merely reacts to proposals. Assorted coalitions led by
Natives presented ANCSA to Congress and heavily lobbied for its
adoption.
The Native leaders who lobbied for ANCSA were educated and
capable people, supported by their constituents. 36 Perhaps they overly
31. Id. at 137.
32. Id. at 152.
33. Id. at 182.
34. See Arnott, Legislation: The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: Legisla-
tion Appropriate to the Past and the Future, 9 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 135, 138-39 (1981).
35. See, e.g., T. BERGER, supra note 2, at 13 ("Congress has tried to transform
these people by legislation. . . ."); id. at 26 (Natives perceive that they were not con-
suited.); id. at 88 ("ANCSA is a barrier designed to fall of its own weight."); id. at 90
("Alaska Natives were a problem to be solved, and Congress thought it knew how to
solve it."); id. at 118 ("At the hearings I held throughout Alaska, I heard the same
complaint. 'The U.S. government ignored the mere existence of our tribal govern-
ments and ignored proper procedure.' "); id. at 131 ("While enacting ANCSA, Con-
gress ignored tribal government. .. ").
36. An extensive and nearly contemporaneous report is contained in R. ARNOLD,
ALASKA NATIVE LAND CLAIMS 92-144 (2d ed. 1978). Arnold describes in detail: (1)
the work of organizations such as the Alaska Native Federation, Alaska Native Broth-
erhood, and Tanana Chiefs Conference; (2) the unqualified support of the National
Congress of American Indians and Association on American Indian Affairs; and (3)
the efforts of well-known Native leaders like Emil Notti, Willie Hensley, and Donald
Wright.
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publicized the benefits that would allegedly flow from ANCSA. Re-
gardless of the Native leaders' good intentions, they caused their con-
stituents to believe that ANCSA and its corporate structure would
bring them wealth. The promise of material wealth, not the preserva-
tion of subsistence ways of life or the availability of social services in
the local villages, probably caused many Natives readily to give their
approval to ANCSA.37
Although Berger's revisionist account disguises the Natives' mo-
tives for originally embracing ANCSA, many signs reveal the truth.
The Natives and Berger continue to share an unhealthy but telltale
fixation with dividends, out of touch with modem financial theory.38
Village corporations remain profit-oriented despite the oft-cited wis-
dom of adopting a not-for-profit status that would facilitate the deliv-
ery of social, fraternal, and like benefits. 39 The failure stems in part
from the persistent hope among Native shareholders for material
wealth from ANCSA. Native affairs specialists reinforce this unrealis-
tic vision. Berger himself continues to second an erroneous interpre-
tation of corporation law that frowns on altruistic endeavors by
business corporations, or the use of not-for-profit entities.
4 °
37. But cf T. BERGER, supra note 2, at 26 (After ANCSA "Alaska Natives confi-
dently expected that their... way of life" would be protected.); id. at 37 ("Above all,
stockholders have expected the regional corporations to protect traditional ways of life
and ancestral lands used for subsistence.").
Although Natives may have expected village corporations to protect their "way
of life," nothing could be farther from accurate with regard to regional corporations.
Both among Natives and non-Natives, regional corporations have been regarded first,
last, and foremost as profit-seeking entities.
38. Compare T. BERGER, supra note 2, at 25 (election against formation as not-
for-profit corporations because dividends could not be distributed) and id. at 29
(ANCSA corporate directors have not felt compelled to declare dividends because
their shareholders are "assigned to them by an act of Congress.") and id. at 33 (stating
that village corporations' distributions from the Alaska Native Fund "could not long
support operating budgets, let alone pay dividends") and id. at 37 ("In theory, the
regional corporations can provide shareholders with jobs and pay them dividends, but
in fact ... most corporations have never paid regular dividends.") and id. at 40 ("A
healthy balance sheet cannot always be translated into... dividends....") with Black,
The Dividend Puzzle, 2 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 5, 6-8 (1976) (reviewing factors such as
double taxation of dividend income and modem portfolio theory that should make
shareholders more indifferent to receipt of dividend income).
39. See, e.g., Branson, supra note 1, at 134-36.
40. See, e.g., T. BERGER, supra note 2, at 25 (village corporations advised and
expected to incorporate as for-profit entities; inference that otherwise legal difficulties
would have been encountered); id. at 159 ("A corporation cannot take from the rich
and give to the poor without facing a shareholders' suit; but a tribal government can
implement measures designed to achieve social justice."). These overstated or slightly
warped propositions should be contrasted with well-evolved notions of corporate so-
cial responsibility activities and judicial reluctance to review good faith decisions by
boards of directors. See, e.g., Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1247
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Contrary to Berger's one-sided analysis, what Alaska needs is an
open discussion that encourages the presentation of disparate points of
view. The first step to such an impartial, rational discourse is the de-
velopment of an analytical framework within which to evaluate
ANCSA. At most, Berger provides an incomplete framework. A
complete, functional set of parameters is, of course, beyond the scope
of this book review. Nonetheless, it is possible to set forth a few
ground rules that would facilitate productive analysis.
1. ANCSA, though flawed in execution, was negotiated at arms
length by capable Native leaders and was, therefore, probably fair.
In the latter pages of his book, Berger adopts a righteous tone.
He suggests that Alaska Natives have been denied "the rights held by
other Native Americans" and that this denial is not "morally defensi-
ble."' 41 In reality what proves indefensible is Berger's assertion.
Alaska Natives have never known the mistreatment and misery exper-
ienced by Indian peoples from other parts of the United States. In the
settlement of their land claims, the Alaska Natives received approxi-
mately one billion dollars and title to forty-four million acres of land,
which constituted eleven percent of Alaska and eighty-nine percent of
all private lands in the state.42 The ANCSA land grants are equivalent
in area to the State of Missouri, and are significantly larger than all of
Pennsylvania or New York.
Besides the sheer size of the settlement, other indicia of fairness
exist. As previously noted, capable Natives bargained for the settle-
ment.43 In that process, they negotiated from positions of relative
strength. Native claims blocked construction of the pipeline necessary
for Alaska North Slope oil to find its way to the market. 44 Congress
quickly had to resolve Native land claims. Both the size of the settle-
ment and the process leading to it indicate that ANCSA constituted a
fair, arms length settlement.
The fair settlement, however, may have been flawed in execution.
The exclusive utilization of corporations as receptacles for the settle-
ment probably was a mistake.45 A portion of the land deeded to the
(1979); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS § 4.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1985) (business judgment rule and its modem
application).
41. T. BERGER, supra note 2, at 157.
42. See, e.g., id. at 24 (197 million acres of federal, 124 million acres of state, and
44 million acres of ANCSA lands in Alaska's 375 million acres); R. ARNOLD, supra
note 36, at 272.
43. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
44. See generally M. BERRY, THE POLITICS OF OIL AND NATIVE LAND CLAIMS
(1975).
45. It deserves mention that Natives apparently suggested a corporate form of
organization in the first place. See, e.g., Arott, supra note 34, at 148 (citing Hearings
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corporations likely should have been put beyond the reach of corpo-
rate takeover or corporate mismanagement by the Natives.46 The cor-
porate vehicle and share ownership have divided a resource that is, or
should be in part, indivisible.47 The division will become greater as
Natives trade their shares after 1991. As subsistence lands, some of
the ANCSA corporate lands must be viewed as belonging to all of the
Native people instead of the particular subgroup which happens to
own the shares.
In retrospect, another flaw in the settlement was the granting of
millions of acres of land and millions of dollars to corporate shells that
lacked experienced management and established business operations.
In the normal course of events, a business and its management grow
and receive progressively larger infusions of capital and other re-
sources. To the extent that the ANCSA formula bypassed this normal
growth pattern it was a prescription for failure that deserves a remedy.
2. In evaluating ANCSA, fault should be assessed on all sides.
While non-Natives deserve partial blame for the problems of
ANCSA, the Natives are not without fault. There has been monu-
mental mismanagement by Natives. This mismanagement has taken
the form not only of misfeasance and malfeasance but also of venal
conduct of the worst sort. Bluntly put, a few Natives motivated by
greed have exploited other Natives and the corporations to the extent
of millions of dollars.48
Excessive litigation by the Native corporations and their repre-
sentatives constitutes another form of mismanagement. 49 Although
the points of comparison are very rough, one study of 190 public cor-
porations randomly selected from the 1975 Fortune study shows that
in American corporations shareholder litigation takes place a median
of once every 6.7 years. 50 ANCSA regional corporations have been
named as participants in 155 reported decisions over a fourteen-year
on S. 2906, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1970)); id. at 154 (Natives proposed 12 regional
corporations rather than one larger corporation).
46. Perhaps a significant portion of the lands held by village corporations could be
transferred. Less justification exists, however, for the transfer of regional corpora-
tions' holdings. Given the profit-seeking nature of the regional corporations, the gen-
eral assumption had to be that those lands could be at risk.
47. See, e.g., T. BERGER, supra note 2, at 17.
48. See, e.g., Moses v. McGarvey, 614 P.2d 1363 (Alaska 1980) (allegations of
self-dealing by regional corporation's president and his daughter); Branson, supra note
1, at 120 n.89 (allegations of mismanagement surrounding construction of Calista
Sheraton Hotel).
49. For example, sources indicate that the corporations have expended approxi-
mately thirty-five million dollars in legal fees for the litigation of a single issue, namely
the subsurface resource provisions of ANCSA. T. BERGER, supra note 2, at 9.
50. Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Incidence of Shareholder Derivative
and Class Action Lawsuits, 1971-1978, 60 B.U.L. REv. 306, 312 (1980). For purposes
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period, for a frequency of occurrence of 1.16 lawsuits per regional cor-
poration per year.5 1 This ANCSA statistic, moreover, does not in-
clude suits filed but voluntarily dismissed pursuant to a settlement or
nonsuit. The amount of money spent by ANCSA corporations
in seeking judicial solutions clearly represents a form of
mismanagement. 52
3. Native Alaskans will not be able to recreate the economic, polit-
ical, or social climate that existed prior to the passage of ANCSA.
The 1971 ANCSA agreement has generally been perceived as
fair.53 Because the enactment of ANCSA caused a number of changes
in Alaska, the Natives will not be able to write on a clean slate, as
Berger suggests. The Natives should be precluded from taking all of
ANCSA's benefits without bearing its costs, especially in light of their
own mismanagement. Perhaps this line of thought provides a key to
ANCSA's future: save the good in ANCSA. The high road approach
of a late date, near complete rejection of ANCSA, advocated by Ber-
ger, would prove too costly and would unfairly disadvantage other
Alaskans, creditors of the corporations, and the United States
Treasury.
4. Any meaningful discussion of ANCSA's future must include di-
vergent points of view and draw from all appropriate disciplines.
The reexamination of ANCSA cannot be limited to Indian and
Native affairs policy analysis, but must also include corporate and eco-
nomic analysis. Thus far, Indian and Native affairs specialists like
Berger have dominated the discussion about the future of ANCSA.
These specialists, naturally inclined toward what they know best, fo-
cus on tribal government, reservation status, and government appro-
priation. Admittedly, some solutions do lie in those directions.
Many ANCSA problems, however, are economic, and require
management and economic analysis. Such economic analysis may
unearth reasons for ANCSA's shortcomings or failures that are alto-
gether different from those advanced by Native affairs specialists. For
of the Jones study, "shareholder litigation" encompassed three types of suits: (1) de-
rivative suits; (2) class action suits; and (3) individual suits. Id. at 309.
51. Lexis search conducted under the names of the 13 ANCSA regional corpora-
tions, dated March 15, 1986, on file with the Alaska Law Review.
52. In fact, from ANCSA's earliest days the tendency seems to have been to rely
on litigation or to seek legislative and political solutions to Native problems. This
overdependency on litigation and politics has caused the corporations to neglect eco-
nomic analysis and the development of management skills. Proposals such as Berger's
seem to reinforce this tendency to seek judicial and political solutions.
53. See, e.g., R. ARNOLD, supra note 36, at 145-48; Arnott, supra note 34, at 157-
60. See also supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text (arguments based upon circum-
stances leading up to and surrounding bargaining for the original 1971 settlement).
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example, economic analysis and academic corporation law increas-
ingly focus on the theory of the firm.5 4 One aspect of the theory of the
firm concerns the market for corporate control. When corporate man-
agement operates inefficiently, share prices will reflect the inefficiency.
If share prices sufficiently decline, a third party may seek corporate
control by purchasing enough voting shares to mandate the election of
corporate representatives who, in the third party's opinion, will man-
age efficiently. Corporate managers, faced with this threat to their in-
cumbency, are forced to operate efficiently.
Market forces may discipline corporate managers better than
legal restraints and produce the best results for all concerned, includ-
ing shareholders.5 5 In Alaska Native corporations, however, the mar-
ket for corporate control cannot operate either in its ex post or its ex
ante aspects because of the restrictions on alienation. This does not
necessarily mean that the Natives' shares should be freely alienable.
The example merely demonstrates that any analysis of ANCSA must
include a full scale examination of the modern theory of the firm and
of other forms of relevant economic analysis.
Any analysis of the problems of ANCSA also requires a close
look at corporation law. Berger's one-sided study seems to be plagued
by a dearth of understanding of corporation law. He accepts at face
value a representation that corporate existence under ANCSA costs
village corporations $70,000 each annually. 56 A rudimentary knowl-
edge of corporation law would inform him that tens of thousands of
comparably sized corporations in Alaska and elsewhere exist with no
more than several hundred dollars compliance costs each year.
Berger fails to perceive the adaptability of modern business as-
sociations. He does not recognize that Native corporations could cast
share transfer restrictions in the form of options rather than rights of
first refusal. 57 Once shares become alienable, with option share re-
strictions in place, ANCSA corporations would have a contractual
right to re-acquire selling Natives' shares at a fixed option price rather
than having to match a third party's highest offer, as in a right of first
refusal restriction. In that manner, Native corporations' treasuries
54. The seminal piece is Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Be-
havior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). A more
recent piece is Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POLIT. ECON.
288 (1980).
55. See Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON.
110 (1965); see also Carney, Toward a More Perfect Market for Corporate Control, 9
DEL. J. CORP. L. 593 (1984).
56. T. BERGER, supra note 2, at 33 ("[T]he minimum cost to a village of carrying
out the corporate duties that ANCSA has imposed on it is about $70,000 annually.").
57. See id. at 102.
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might be preserved and, simultaneously, post-1991 intra-firm share re-
strictions made to work. Based on an incomplete understanding of
corporation law, Berger also rejects other forms of entity, such as non-
profit corporations.5 8 Likewise, he never probes the possibility of
amending Alaska state law to make other forms of entity amenable to
both Native and non-Native needs.59
What any study of ANCSA needs is participation by corporation
law specialists who fully understand how to utilize the extreme flexi-
bility afforded by modem corporation law. The participation of econ-
omists, corporate specialists, and other experts could supplement and
explain in an accurate, complete, and impartial manner the full range
of options for 1991 and beyond.
ANCSA is too important to Alaska and to the Natives involved
for its future to be determined by one-sided studies and hasty, emo-
tional recommendations. Thomas Berger had an extraordinary oppor-
tunity to study ANCSA. Village Journey reveals that he largely failed
to capitalize fully on that opportunity. Fortunately, several years re-
main before the watershed year 1991 arrives. Time still remains for
the completion of the thorough study of ANCSA that Natives, non-
Natives, the State of Alaska, and other interested parties deserve.
58. See, eg., id. at 114 (observation that non-profit corporation law provides for a
minimum quorum of only ten percent with no apparent understanding of how higher
quorum requirements can be implemented).
59. See, e.g., id. at 114-15 (discussion of Alaska law governing cooperatives, in-
cluding five percent quorum requirement; no discussion of amending Alaska law to
make quorum and other features more suitable for Native organizations). Cf Bran-
son, supra note 1, at 112-14, 132-34 (suggested revisions of Alaska statutes to result in
better mesh between ANCSA and corporation law).
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